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LEGAL AND MATEEMATICAL ASPECTS OF
CUMULATIVE VOTING
ARTrHuR T. COLZ, JR.*
Cumulative voting is a development of corporate voting, and was
innovated for the purpose of giving minority stockholders the op-
portunity to be represented on the board of directors.' Under the
common law each stockholder voted per capita and not according
to the number of shares he owned.2 But this rule no longer applies
in modern corporate voting.3  At present, in the absence of con-
trary regulations, it is generally held that shares of stock constitute
the basis for voting. This rule is obviously much more just than
the earlier one, as it permits those who have the largest monetary
interest in a corporation, and who stand to lose the most by its
improper management, to elect a majority of directors, and thereby
to gain a controlling interest.
Cumulative voting gives a stockholder one vote for each share of
stock which he owns multiplied by the number of directors to be
elected, which votes may be cast for one candidate or dispersed
among several. Thus, a mass of votes is placed in the hands of a
minority interest, which mass may be concentrated on a minority
candidate; thereby tending to permit minority representation com-
mensurate with the minority capital interest. It is practicable only
where all the directors are to be elected on one ballot, since it is
impossible to vote cumulatively on a single proposition. Cumulative
voting is a stockholder's right and does not apply to corporations
having neither shares of stock nor stockholders. 4 In South Caro-
lina it is used only in the election of directors, trustees, or managers,
and is never used for voting on propositions of corporate policy, fi-
nance, etc. This seems to be the general rule elsewhere. The case
of State ex rel. Springs v. Ellisons aptly illustrates the mechanics of
cumulative voting. In this instance a majority group of stockholders
controlled 57 shares, and a minority group controlled 39 shares, out
of a total of 100 shares of capital stock. The remaining four shares
were apparently not voted. There were seven directors to be elected
0Member of South Carolina Bar, Columbia, S. C.
1. 5 FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OV CORPORATIONS §2048 (Perm. ed. 1931).
2. 63 A. L. R 1106; 7 R. C. L. 339.
3. 63 Id. 1107; 7 Id. 340.
4. Note 1.
5. 106 S. C. 139, 90 S. E. 699 (1916), 13 A. L. R. 130.
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and eleven candidates, seven of which were favored by the majority
and four by the minority. By concentrating its votes on its four
candidates, the minority was able to put all of them in office on the
first ballot 6, the majority votes being divided among the seven. It
may readily be seen, therefore, that this method of voting may be-
come a powerful weapon in the hands of a minority group of stock-
holders when the majority is divided or has spread its votes over
a comparatively large number of candidates, as was done here.
In the United States the right of cumulative voting is required by
constitutional provision in some states.7 In others it is required by
statute.8 But in some states it is merely made permissive by statute
6. This election was upset on a second ballot which was cast after the minority
group had withdrawn from the meeting, and the litigation over the outcome
of this second ballot involved issues not pertinent to the topic of this article,
An apt statement concerning situations analogous to that portrayed in the
Ellison case may be of interest at this juncture. In 2 Cook, A Ta ArTis ON T11E
LAW Or CORPORATIONS, §609-a, p.p. 1781-1782 (7th ed. 1913) it is said: "There
are certain dangers about this mode of voting, and an unwary majority may
find that a smart minority has deprived the majority of the control." And in
the note, p. 1782, this statement is furthered as follows: "Thus, suppose there
are 1,000 shares, and ten directors to be elected, and one person holds 600
shares. Clearly he should be able to elect a majority of the ten directors. Suppose
he votes his 600 votes for six of his friends (A, B, C, D, E, and F) and for
four of the minority (G, H, I, and J) ; and suppose at the same time the 400
shares of the minority are cumulated on three other parties (K, L, and M),
with ten votes for the four directors mentioned above (G, H, I, and 3). The
result will then be as follows:
A, B, C, D, E, and F have 600 votes each
G, H, I, and J 610
K, L, and M 1,320
"In other words, the minority have secured a majority of the directors. Again,
suppose the holder of the 600 shares does not vote for any minority candidate
at all, but casts 600 votes for each of his six candidates, A, B, C, D, B, F. Even
then he may lose the election. The minority 400 may cumulate their 4,000 votes
on six candidates, and give each of the six 666-2/3 votes. Under the cumulative
system the majority, in order to be safe, must not only abandon the idea of
electing the whole board, but must cumulate their votes on such a proportion
of the board as their stock bears to the whole stock, and must not cast compli-
mentary votes for representatives of the minority."
7. E. g., ILL. CoNsT., Art. XI, §3.
8. E. g., THROCIc.ORTON'S OHIO CODE ANN., §8623-(50) (1940).
In Young, The Case for Cumuative Voling, WIscoNsIN LAw REVimW, Vol.
1950, No. 1, p.p. 49, 54 (Jan. 1950), statistics as of 1948 are cited which show
that 20 states have made cumulative voting mandatory either by constitution
or by statute, and that 17 others have made it permissive if the articles of in-
corporation require it. The states in which it is mandatory are: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. The states
in which it is permissive are: Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia. Also, the
National Banking Act has made it mandatory in all national banks since 1933.
(12 U. S. C. A. §61.)
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whenever the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws so provide9,
and in still others the right does not exist at all. The provision for
cumulative voting in the South Carolina Constitution1 0 of 1895 reads
as follows:
"The General Assembly shall provide by law for the election
of directors, trustees or managers of all corporations so that
each stockholder shall be allowed to cast, in person or by proxy,
as many votes as the number of shares he owns multiplied by
the number of directors, trustees or managers to be elected, the
same to be cast for any one candidate or to be distributed among
two or more candidates."
A statute which failed to make provision for the election of directors,
trustees or managers, pursuant to this section, was, by way of dicta,
stated to violate it in Carolina, etc., Ry. v. McCown.1 '
And in the case of Alderman v. Alderman 2 , it was held that a con-
tract, whereby certain stockholders of a corporation transferred their
stock to other stockholders, who were to act as trustees and hold the
legal title to such stock with full power to vote the same, was not
violative of this constitutional provision. Therefore, it would seem
to be legal in this state to use stock for voting purposes, the dividends
of which are enjoyed by another person.
In the case of Looker v. Maynard ex rel. Dusenbury'3 the United
States Supreme Court declared that a Michigan statute which per-
mitted cumulatie voting did not violate the contract clause of the
United States Constitution, nor impair the contractual obligations be-
tween the State of Michigan and the plaintiff corporation, which obli-
gations were incurred at the date of incorporation. In that case the
corporation had been created before the enactment of the challenged
statute. But, since the Michigan Constitution had previously reserved
to the state the right to alter, amend or repeal future acts of incorpora-
9. E. g., NEw MEX. STAT. ANN., Vol. 4, §54-406 (1941); and FIAcl'S ANN.
CODX OF Mn., Art. XXIII, §24.
10. Art. IX, §11. This section has been executed by statute: §7680, S. C.
ConE or LAWS (1942). An apt statement describing the mechanics of a similar
constitutional provision was made by Gordon, J., in Pierce v. Commonvealth,
104 Pa. St. 150 (1883), as follows: "If there are six directors to be elected,
the single shareholder has six votes, and, contrary to the old rule, he may
cast those six votes for a single one of the candidates, or he may distribute
them to txvo or more of such candidates as he may think proper. He may
cast two ballots for each of three of the proposed directors, three for two, or
two for one and one each for four others, or finally, he may cast one vote for
each of the six candidates."
11. 84 S. C. 318, 327 66 S. E. 418, 426 (1909).
12. 178 S. C. 9, 24; 181 S. E. 897, 903 (1935).
13. 179 U. S. 46 (1900).
3
Cole: Legal and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting
Published by Scholar Commons, 1950
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QuATERLmY
tion, the court read this reservation into the contract between Michi-
gan and the plaintiff corporation. The classic case of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward14, which previously had unequivocally declared
that a state may not by legislation, subsequent to incorporation, im-
pair its contractual obligations with a corporation, was distinguished
from the Looker case on the ground that the State of New Hampshire
had not by its Constitution reserved to itself the right to alter future
contracts of incorporation.
Whether and how the rule stated in the Looker case would affect
corporations organized prior to 1895 has not been passed on in any
South Carolina case. The likelihood of any present litigation affect-
ing corporations chartered prior to 1895, as it relates to cumulative
voting, is extremely remote. In the first place, the number of cor-
porations organized prior to 1895 and now in existence is bound to
be very small. In the second place, because, under the provisions of
Article 9, Section 17, of the South Carolina Constitution of 1895, the
acceptance by any then existing corporation of any benefits conferred
by that Constitution, or by subsequent legislation, "shall be conclu-
sively held an agreement by such corporation to hold its charter and
franchises under the provisions of this Article". In other words, any
corporation in existence before the adoption of the Constitution of
1895, would, in order to accept the benefit of subsequent laws, have
to accept the constitutional requirement of cumulative voting. Mani-
festly, practically all, if not all, South Carolina corporations now
doing business have proceeded under and accepted the provisions
of the Constitution of 1895 and of subsequent legislation. In so
doing they have likewise subjected themselves to the cumulative vot-
ing provision, and, of course, must abide by it.15
The foregoing summary of the legal status of cumulative voting
in South Carolina naturally leads into a survey of its resulting ma-
thematical complexities and their solution. There are many thousands
of corporations in this state, all of which are required by law to hold
elections of directors at least once annually, and to elect the "directors,
14. 4 WHPAT. 518, (U. S., 1819).
15. In Commonwealth v. Flannery, 203 Pa. St. 28, 52 A.129 (1902), this
precise situation occurred. The Pennsylvania constitution of 1874 required cumu-
lative voting. It also required that no corporation created before the enactment
of this constitution could have its charter amended "except upon the condition
that such corporation shall thereafter hold its charter subject to the provisions
of this constitution." A literary corporation, created in 1870, had its charter
amended by a Pennsylvania court in 1892. In 1901, a dispute arose over the
validity of certain cumulative votes cast in an election of directors. The court
held that the corporation, though created prior to the enactment of the constitu-
tion of 1874, was bound by its terms, including the provision for cumulative
voting, because of the amending of its charter in 1892.
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trustees or managers", as the case may be, by means of cumulative
voting. Corporate practice for the average South Carolina attorney
will probably increase in the future with consequent growing demands
upon his skill and resourcefulness in this specialized field. Since prob-
lems involving the computation of cumulative votes are almost cer-
tain to arise, it would seem to be advisable for him to have at 'his
fingertips a simplified and workable system of solving them by alge-
bra. Since there are few books 16 which deal with this topic, it is
the purpose of this article to condense for the reader at least a part
of the scant information which is now in print. The chief and most
valuable source of information presented here has been the very note-
worthy article of Mr. Charles W. Gerstenberg, "The Mathematics of
Cumulative Voting".17
Nine of the formulae contained therein, as well as two especially
prepared for this article by Mr. Charles W. Huff18 , and one prepared
by the writer, will be discussed. Though they may at first sight look
formidable, the reader is assured that they will be illustrated in the
simplest possible terms.
The first five formulae presuppose the existence of the following
type of situation: a corporation, with a given number of shares of
capital stock outstanding, all of which are to be used for voting pur-
poses in an approaching directors' election, and with only two rival
factions among the stockholders, either of which desires to ascertain
the number of shares it will need in order to elect a given number of
directors out of the total to be elected. Suppose, for example, that
a minority faction wished to elect two out of five directors at an ap-
proaching directors' election, there being 100 shares of stock outstand-
ing, each share having equal voting power. The following formula
may be used:
ac
(1) X= b+1 + 1.
16. E. g., 1 P-H Corp. Serv. 3545 (1947); Dauten, Busines Finance,
PRZNTIcE HALL, INc.
17. Gerstenberg, The Mathematics of 'Cumulative Voting. JOURNAL o' Ac-
CoUNTANCy (Jan. 1910).
All the algebraic formulae used in this article, except three which will be
specifically referred to by footnote, are the original work of Mr. Gerstenberg.
The formulae themselves, with the exception of formula 12, have been set
forth here exactly as they appear in the original article. But, the illustrative
material which demonstrates such formulae is original with the present writer.
This is pointed out due to the fact that the JOURNAL OF AccouNTANcy requests
that no material be used except that which is quoted directly from Mr. Gersten-
berg's article. This article by Mr. Gerstenberg is now available at the library
of the University of South Carolina Law School.
18. B.S., M.S., Instructor of Mathematics, University of South Carolina.
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The letter a represents the total shares of stock, i. e., 100; b repre-
sents the total number of directors to be elected, i. e., 5; c represents
the number of directors that the minority faction wishes to elect,
i. e., 2; and x is the unknown number of shares which the minority
must control in order to accomplish this result. Substituting figures
for symbols:
100 X 2 200
5= +1 +1=-1 33-1/3 +1 = 34-1/3, or 34.5+1 6
Since one cannot purchase a third of a share, the fraction may be
dropped, and the answer, therefore, is 34.19 This result may be
proved by simple arithmetic. The reader is cautioned, however, al-
ways to distinguish between votes, on the one hand, and shares on
the other. It must be remembered that one has as many votes as
the number of shares he controls, multiplied by the number of
directors to be elected. The total number of shares outstanding is
100, and the total number of votes which these shares can produce
is 100 X 5 or 500. The minority group, pursuant to the result
reached by formula (1), must purchase enough additional shares
to make its total holding 34 shares, which will place in its hands
34 X 5 or 170 votes. The majority faction would not then be in a
position to control more than 100-34 or 66 shares, which shares
tould not produce more than 66 X 5 or 330 votes. That the two
factions would together control the total voting power of the corpora-
tion is evident, since the sum of 170 and 330 is 500. The minority
group may so divide its votes as to give 2 X 170 or 85 votes to each
of its two candidates.
Now, if the majority attempted to defeat one of the minority
candidates, by nominating four of its own, it could only give to each
of them Y X 330 or 82y votes. Since a vote may not be divided, it
could only give two of its candidates 83 votes apiece, and the other
two 82 votes apiece. It is evident, therefore, that the minority would
be able to elect its two candidates, since the majority could not cast
as many as 85 votes for each of its four candidates. If the minority
controlled one share less, viz., 33 shares, they would thereby have
only 33 X 5 or 165 votes. One of its candidates could only receive
'83 votes, and the other, 82. Therefore, it would be defeated in its
purpose to elect two out of five directors. This formula, as well as
19. In Mr. Gerstenberg's article supra, the fraction is dropped, which method
will be used, where applicable, in this article. However, in the short article in
1 P-H CoaP. SERv. 3545 (1947), it is suggested that the fraction be counted
as a whole number. But this is not necessary, except in the case of formulae
(11-12), as will be pointed out later.
6
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the four subsequent formulae, could also be used to solve any similar
problem by either a minority or majority faction. If the total number
of shares outstanding will not be used for voting purposes, then
the symbol a, which represented such number of shares in formula
(1), could be used to represent the total number of shares which
are to be voted; but, in any event, all of the needed number of shares
indicated by the answer must be purchased out of the particular
pool of shares represented by the symbol a. This is true of all of
the first five formulae. However, other formulae (6-12) will be
used later in this article to solve problems arising where all of the
outstanding shares are not used for voting purposes, and where the
shares indicated by the answer may be purchased out of a pool of
shares which is separate and distinct from the pool of shares used
in solving said formulae. It may be pointed out, however, that the
accuracy of formula (1), as well as of the other formulae used in
this article, will be impaired if all of the shares represented by the
symbol a, or by other applicable symbols in subsequent formulae, are
not used for voting purposes in a given election, or, if the opposite
faction is divided and distributes its votes among a greater number
of candidates than was anticipated. In such a case, the faction using
these formulae would purchase a greater number of shares than is
actually needed. On the other hand, if a greater number of shares
than such symbols indicate are used by an opposing faction, then
the faction using these formulae will be defeated in its purpose, be-
cause the formulae are designed to indicate the absolute minimum
number of shares needed for a given purpose. In many instances
if the opposing faction uses one share more than the number of shares
used as a basis of computation in these formulae, such faction will
defeat at least one candidate of the faction using said formulae. How-
ever, with this one exception, and omitting of course, the remote
possibility that the total number of directors would be lessened, these
formulae presuppose the existence of the worst possible situation,
and since any other alteration of such situation would be advantageous,
it is obvious that the exact number of shares which the faction using
such formulae could need will be amassed in its hands. Consequent-
ly, it would be a mathematical impossibility for any of its candidates
to be defeated in the election.
The second formula may be used in order to ascertain the number
of shares one must control in order to elect all of the directors:
ab
(2) = + 1.
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Using the same figures which were substituted in the first formula
for the symbols a, i. e. 100; and b, i. e. 5, and remembering that x
here represents the unknown number of shares required to elect all
of the directors, we find that
100 X 5 500
S 5 +- 1=- 1 = 83-1/3 +1 = 84-1/3, or 84.5+1 6
In other words, it would require 84 out of the 100 shares outstand-
ing in order to elect all five of the directors. The reader may prove
this formula in the same manner in which the first was proved.
In order to ascertain the number of shares required in order to
elect only one out of the five directors, and using the same figures
which were used in the foregoing formulae to represent the symbols a
and b, respectively, a third formula"0 may be used, vis:
(3) =. ++1
Substituting:
100 100
--+ +1 6 + 1 = 16-2/3 +1 = 17-2/3, or 17.
Here, 17 would be the least number of shares that could be used in
order to elect one out of five directors. One share less than this
would be the highest number of shares which would fall just short
of electing one director, which number could be ascertained by the
use of the following formula :21
a
(4) 
b+
Substituting 100 for a and 5 for b, it may be ascertained that:
100 100
X-= = 16-2/3, or 16.
5+1 6
Mr. Charles W. Huff2 2 has especially prepared for the use of this
article a formula which will enable the reader to ascertain a different
unknown element, c. In the first four formulae, it may be noted that
x, the number of shares required in order to accomplish a given
20. It should be noted that x here represents the number of shares required
in order to elect one director.
21. Here x represents the greatest number of shares which would be utterly
worthless for voting purposes.
22. See Note 18.
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purpose, was the unknown element. The known elements were a,
the total number of shares outstanding; b, the total number of di-
rectors to be elected; and c, the number of directors which a faction
wished to elect in a given instance. But suppose x is known, and c
is unknown. In other words, suppose a stockholder does not wish
to purchase additional stock, but merely wishes to ascertain how many
directors he can elect with the number of shares he already holds?
The following formula will solve his problem :23
(5 (x-1) (b+l)
a
To demonstrate this formula, let us assume that a stockholder owns
51 shares out of a total of 100 shares of stock outstanding, and that
he wishes to ascertain how many directors he may safely try to elect
out of a total of five directors.
Substituting:
(51-1) (5+1) 50X6 300
C- - --- -3.
100 100 100
In this particular case the result is a whole number. But suppose
the stockholder owned only 50 shares. Then, the result would involve
a fraction, being 2-94/100 directors. Obviously 94/100 of a di-
rector could not be elected. However, the fraction indicates an im-
portant fact, viz. that the stockholder has almost enough shares to
elect 3 directors. Speaking graphically, he lacks only 6/100 of a
director. When the fraction is a very large one, as is the case here,
it indicates that with the purchase of only a few additional shares,
the stockholder could elect one more director. If the fraction, how-
ever, is small, this would indicate that a considerable number of shares
would have to be purchased in order to elect one more director. It
also would show that he could elect the number of directors indicated
by the whole number preceding the fraction, by a safe margin, and
perhaps, that he could even sell some of his shares and still elect such
number of directors. In the present instance, assuming that the
stockholder owns only 50 shares, which shares will elect only 2-94/100
directors, in order to ascertain how many additional shares he would
23. The letter c in this formula represents the number of directors which
a stockholder may elect when he controls a given number of shares, which
number is represented by the letter x. The letters a and b represent the same
items which they represented in the first four formulae. It is to be noted that
formula (5) was derived from formula (1).
9
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need in order to elect three directors, the stockholder could use for-
mula (1), supra, and substitute the applicable figures, as follows:
100X3 + I = 3 1 =50+ 1 =51.
5+1 6
Therefore, since the stockholder's present holding is already 50
shares he would need to purchase only one additional share in order
to elect three directors. This result may be readily proved to be
correct by a glance back at the result of formula (5), where it was
learned that three directors can be elected by the use of 51 shares.
A second type of situation may often arise in corporate voting when
it is known that all of the outstanding shares in a corporation will
not be used for voting purposes at an election. This situation is
more apt to occur in the case of a large corporation where there are
large numbers of disinterested and widely scattered stockholders,
each owning a relatively small number of shares; and it probably will
less often arise in the case of a small corporation, where all of the stock
is in the hands of a few individuals each of whom takes an active in-
terest in the affairs of the corporation. Suppose a corporation has
500 shares of stock outstanding, most of which are distributed among
many small stockholders who are totally disinterested in the out-
come of corporate elections. Let us assume, furthermore, that there
is a majority faction, which controls 57 shares of this stock, and a
minority faction which controls 39 shares.2 At an approaching di-
rector's election, at which seven directors are to be elected, the minori-
ty faction wishes to ascertain how many shares of stock it will need
in order to elect four directors. It anticipates that the majority
faction will also attempt to elect four directors. Remembering that
the majority faction will use only 57 shares, and that it will distribute
the votes produced by these 57 shares among only four candidates,
how many shares must the minority faction control in order to elect
its four candidates, and thereby defeat the ambition of the majority
group to control the board of directors? This problem may be solved
by the use of the following formula:
24. This situation is analogous to that which existed in the case of State ex
rel. Springs v. Ellison, Note 5, except that in the present instance there arc
500, rather than 100, shares of stock outstanding, and that the majority faction
will concentrate its 57 shares on four, rather than seven, candidates. It may
be remembered that in that case the minority faction, with only 39 shares,
elected four directors on the first ballot, but only because the majority faction
was divided. The reader is cautioned to distinguish between the number of
candidates which each side nominates, and the total number of directors to be
elected. The 'number of candidates, obviously, will in most instances exceed the
total number of directors to be elected.
10
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cr +b+ 1
b-c+l
In this formula, b represents the total number of directors to be
elected; c represents the number of directors whom the minority fac-
tion wishes to elect; r represents the number of shares controlled by
the majority faction, all of which are to be used for voting purposes;
and y represents the unknown number of shares needed by the minori-
ty faction. In this particular example, b = 7; c =4; and r = 57.
Substituting:
4 X 57 + 7 + 1 228+8 236
7-4+1 8-4 4
According to this finding, the minority faction would have to control
59 shares in order to elect four out of seven directors. Since the
majority controls 57 shares, and the minority 39, the sum of which
is 96, there are 500 - 96, or 404 unvoted shares which may be pur-
chased. Therefore, the minority would have to purchase 20 of these
shares in order to elect four out of seven directors, since 59 -39 - 20.
It is obvious that none of these 20 shares has to be purchased from
among the 57 shares controlled by the majority faction, but rather,
may be purchased from an independent pool of shares. If they were
purchased from among the 57 majority shares, which fact would
probably less often occur, then the minority would simply have more
shares than it actually needed in order to elect four out of seven
directors. This may be illustrated if it is assumed for a moment
that the minority does not have any shares at all, and that the majori-
ty has 57. If 57 is substituted for the letter a in formula (1), the
answer indicates that the minority would need 29 shares in order to
elect four out of seven directors. However, if 57 is substituted for
the letter r in formula (6), in the identical situation, the answer indi-
cates that the minority would need 59 shares, as has already been
shown. The reason for this apparent discrepancy is that in the case
of formula (1), all of the 29 shares must be purchased from among
the 57 shares controlled by the majority, thereby reducing its shares
accordingly; whereas, in the case of formula (6), the 59 shares may
all be purchased from an independent pool. In either instance the
minority group would have the minimum number of shares required
in order to elect four out of seven directors. The same fact concern-
ing formula (6) is also true of formulae (7-12).
In order to ascertain the number of shares which the minority fac-
11
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tion would need, in the situation involving formula (6) in order to
elect all of the directors, it could use the following formula:
(7) y = br + 1.
Remembering that b = 7, and r = 57, we may solve for y.
2 5
Thus:
y =7 X 57+ 1 = 399 + 1 = 400.
If the minority wishes to ascertain the number of shares needed to
elect only one director in the same situation, and thus defeat the am-
bition of the majority to elect seven directors, it may use the formula:
(~) r
(8) y = + 1.b
Since b = 7, and r = 57, then26 :
57
y 57 + = 8-1/7 + 1 = 9-1/7, or 9.7
Since 9 shares would be the minimum amount needed in order to
place one minority candidate in office, it naturally follows that 8 shares
would fail to elect even one director. This fact could be demonstrat-
ed by the use of the following formula27 :
r
(9) y =
Substituting 57 for r and 7 for b, we find that28 :
57
y - = 8-1/7, or 8.7
If the minority faction desired to ascertain the number of directors
which it could elect with a given number of shares, it could use the
following formula :29
(10) C _ = (b+1) (y-l)y+r
25. The letter y here represents the number of shares which the minority
faction needs in order to elect all of the directors.
26. Here y represents the number of shares which the minority faction needs
in order to elect only one director.
27. The writer derived this formula from formula (8).
28. In this instance, y represents the number of shares which will fall just
short of electing one director.
29. This formula, which was prepared for this article by Mr. Huff (Note 18),
was derived from formula (6).
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Suppose the minority faction owned 59 shares, and wished to ascer-
tain how many directors these shares would elect in the situation in
which formula (6) was used.
Since b = 7, r = 57, and y = 59, it may be demonstrated that:
(7+ 1) (59- 1) 8X58 464c- = -- 4.
59+57 116 116
Thus, it is shown that the minority faction can elect four directors
by the use of 59 shares in the election. Since it has already been
pointed out in the problem used to demonstrate formula (6), that
it would require 59 shares in order to elect four directors, and since
in that formula the number of shares rather than the number of di-
rectors was the unknown element, it is evident that formulae (6) and
(10) mutually prove each other.
In all of the foregoing formulae, only two factions 'have been in-
volved. But suppose a third faction enters upon the scene and de-
sires to elect one or more directors? Before, presenting the formula
that would meet the needs of such a third faction, reference might
here be made to an hypothetical situation in which such formula may be
used. The situation described in reference to formula (8) provides
a suitable background to demonstrate this new formula. It was
there learned that if the minority faction controlled only 9 shares,
it could elect one out of seven directors, when the majority faction
controlled 57 shares. In other words, the minority would be able
to amass 9 X 7 or 63 votes, all of which it would cast for one candi-
date. The majority faction would be able to command 57 X 7 or 399
votes, 57 of which it could cast for each of its seven candidates. Ob-
viously, the lone candidate of the minority would defeat one of the
majority's seven candidates. But the majority group would be able
so to disperse its votes among six candidates as to cast 67 votes for
each of three candidates and 66 votes for the other three. Now if
a third faction knew the above facts 0 , it would be able to defeat the
minority candidate, who would have the least number of votes of all
seven candidates, by 'he use of the following formula:
y 1
(11) Z= -
+
c b
30. In Mr. Gerstenberg's article, it is declared that the probability of a third
faction being able to discover the facts revealed in a situation analogous to the
above "is remote almost to the degree of impossibility".
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Remembering that y = 9; c = 1; and b = 7; then: 31
9 1 = 63+1 64S-"+ -= - = 9-1/7 =10.
1 7 7 7
Therefore the third faction could, with 10 shares, defeat the mi-
nority candidate. The result in this simplified type of situation is
so obvious that the use of a formula would hardly be necessary, but
as such a situation grows in complexity, its use would greatly expe-
dite the computation of the number of shares which a third faction
would need in order to defeat one minority candidate. Suppose, for
example that the minority faction had purchased enough shares to
make its total holdings 59 shares, as was shown by the use of formulae
(6) and (10). The minority could elect four out of seven directors,82
as it would be able to distribute 59 X 7 or 413 votes among four can-
didates giving 104 votes to one candidate and 103 votes to each of
the other three. The majority could amass 57 X 7 or 399 votes,
and although it could give only 100 votes to each of three candidates,
and 99 votes to the fourth, yet it would be able to cast 133 votes for
each of three candidates. Thus the minority would place its four
candidates in office, as it could give more votes to each of four can-
didates than could the majority. However, the majority would be
able to give many more votes to each of three candidates than the
minority could cast for each of its four candidates.
The reason for this is plain,'if it be remembered that the minority
desired to control the bare minimum number of shares required in
order to elect four directors. With all of the foregoing information
in mind, a third faction would be wasting its money if it desired to
purchase enough unvoted shares in order to overcome one of the
three candidates of the majority, since it could, with many less shares,
defeat one of the four minority candidates. By the use of formula
(11) the third party would learn that:
59 1 413+4 417
-- - = - = 14-25/28 = 15.
4 7 28 28
31. In reaching the above result it will be noted that the fraction is counted
as a whole number. This formula, and formula (12), constitute the only ex-
ceptions to the rule, used consistently throughout this article, that such fractions
be dropped. See Note 19.
32. Here, the minority faction has actually, through the purchase of addi-
tional shares, become a majority faction. However, to avoid confusion of the
two, this faction will be referred to, for the remainder of this article, as the
minority faction.
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The accuracy of this computation may readily be demonstrated, when
we remember that, with 15 shares, the third faction could give 15 X 7
or 105 votes to its sole candidate, which would exceed by one vote
the 104 votes which one minority candidate would receive, and by
two votes, the 103 votes which each of the remaining three minority
candidates would receive. Now, if the minority faction wished to as-
sure the election of its four candidates, not only as against the voting
power of the majority, but also as against the intervention of a third
faction, it would have to give to each of its four candidates a greater
number of votes than the majority could give to each of three can-
didates. It could ascertain the number of shares it would need in
order to achieve this result, by the use of the following formula :33
Cr
(12) y b-c 1.
Here, as in the foregoing formulae, b = 7; c =4; and r = 57.
Substituting:
4 X 57 228
y- ,1-- --+1=76+1 --77.7-4 3 +
This number of shares would produce for the minority 7 X 77 or 539
votes, which number would enable it to cast 135 votes for each of
three candidates, and 134 votes for the fourth. Therefore, it is mani-
fest that the third faction would not prevail over any of the four
minority candidates, as it would only be able with 15 shares, to give
its sole candidate 105 votes, which would be 30 votes less than the
number which three of the minority candidates would receive, and 29
votes less than the number which the fourth minority candidate would
receive. In fact, the third faction candidate would be utterly defeated
in the election, as he would receive 28 votes less than the majority fac-
tion could give to each of three candidates. It would seem there-
fore, that the use of formula (12) would cause the minority to pur-
chase far more than the minimum number of shares required in or-
der to defeat the lone third-faction candidate. However, if the result
of this twelfth formula is scrutinized, it will reveal to the careful
33. This formula originally appeared in Mr. Gerstenberg's article as follows:
cr +1. See Note 17. In formula (12) y represents the number of
-rc
shares which the minority faction needs in order to give to each of its four
candidates more shares than each of three majority candidates could receive.
If any fraction is obtained by the use of this formula, such fraction should be
counted as a whole number. See Notes 19 and 31.
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observer an important fact, viz., that this result would enable the
minority to elect its four candidates even if the third faction was de-
termined to elect its candidate by purchasing whatever number of
shares would be necessary in order to defeat the candidate which
would, in any event, receive the lowest number of votes, whatever
that number would be. In other words, the use of this formula
would give to each of the four minority candidates more votes than
any one majority candidate would receive. A glance back at the
result of formula (12) will show that the minority, by purchasing
the requisite number of shares in order to make its total holding 77
shares, would be able to give, by a small margin, more votes to
each of its four candidates than the majority could give to each of
three candidates. This fact would assure the election of the four
minority candidates as against the ambition of a third faction to
defeat the candidate receiving the lowest number of votes, because
the three majority candidates would here receive the lowest number
of votes.
It has probably occurred already to the thoughtful reader that
some of the foregoing formulae could be used to compute on a per-
centage basis the number of shares required in order to elect direc-
tors in varying situations. To illustrate, the reader is referred to
the problem solved by formula (1). In that instance it was shown
that where a corporation has 100 shares outstanding, and a minority
group wishes to purchase enough shares in order to elect two out
of five directors, it would need 34-1/3, or, dropping the fraction, 34
shares. Since the total number of shares being voted is 100, it is
evident that the above answer may be converted into terms of per-
centage. Such percentage, once it is ascertained, may be used in any
similar situation, regardless of the number of shares which will be
voted, just so long as one desires to elect two out of five directors.
In this instance, the answer obtained by the use of formula (1) is
34, but when converted into terms of percentage it should be 33-1/3,
or 33.3333. This apparent discrepancy is due to the fact that, first
of all, the fraction which was dropped in using the formula must be
used when the answer is converted into terms of percentage, and,
secondly, the unit one which was added to the 33-1/3 shares in the
formula must not be added until after the percentage has been taken
of a given number of shares.
For example, suppose a corporation has 3,500 shares of stock out-
standing. How many of these shares would a minority faction need
in order to elect two out of five directors? By taking 33-1/3, or
33.3333 per cent of 3,500, one finds the answer to be 1,166-2/3, or
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1,166.6667. If the fraction or decimal is dropped and the unit one
added to the product, the answer is 167. The same answer is reached
by substituting 3,500 for the symbol a in formula (1), and solving
for x. Of course, if there were no fraction or decimal in the above
answer, the unit one should still be added to the product.
The chart on page 242 shows the percentage of total stock out-
standing, or of the total stock to be voted, which will be required in
order to elect any given number of directors out of a given total
number to be elected; e. g., two out of 13, eight out of 10, etc. It
is comprehensive in that it covers every legally possible combination
which could arise in South Carolina. The law in this state limits
the number of directors which a corporation may have to 15. " Con-
sequently, the chart covers all possible elective combinations in this
state, which could not be more than 120 in number.
As one faces the chart, it will be noted that on the left-hand side
there is a vertical series of figures ranging from one to 15 and increas-
ing in a downward direction; while, at the top, there is a horizontal
series of figures, ranging from one to 15, and increasing as one reads
from right to left. The vertical row of figures represents the number
of directors one wishes to elect out of a given total, expressed by the
symbol c in the formulae; whereas, the horizontal row represents the
total number of directors to be elected, expressed by the symbol b in
the formulae. For example, if one wished to elect three out of seven
directors, he should find the square which lies directly to the right of
the figure three in the vertical row at the left, and which also falls
directly below the figure seven in the horizontal row at the top. This
5000
figure is 37 .'500 The decimal ".5000" may be used alternatively with
the fraction "2" to which it corresponds. This percentage should
then be multiplied by the total number of shares to be voted, any frac-
tion or decimal should be dropped, and the unit one added to the pro-
duct. The result will be exactly the same as that reached by the use
of formula (1).
There are several types of situations in which this chart may be
used, but its use is limited to cases where formulae (1-5) apply. First,
suppose a corporation has 10,000 shares outstanding, all of which are
to be used for voting purposes in an approaching director's election,
and one who does not own any shares at all desires to purchase
enough shares in order to elect one director out of seven. By using
either formula (1) or (3), or the chart, it will be found that 1,251
34. §7729, S. C. CODE OF LAws (1942).
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is the needed number of shares. However, if one already owns, say,
250 of these shares, this number may be subtracted from 1,251, and
only the remaining 1,001 shares need be purchased. Secondly, sup-
pose that, in the above situation, there was a majority faction which
owned 3,000 shares, all of which would be used in the election, and
that the remaining 7,000 outstanding shares were inactive and would
not be used. By using either formula (1) or (3), or the chart, and
using only the 3,000 majority shares as a basis of computation, it
would be learned that, in order to elect one out of seven directors,
376 shares would be needed. All of these shares, however, would
have to be purchased from among the 3,000 majority shares. But
if one already owned a part of these 3,000 majority shares, for in-
stance, 50 of them, then such number of shares should be subtracted
from the 376 needed shares so that only 326 shares would have to be
purchased, but the remaining 2,950 majority shares would have to
comprise the sole source of such purchase. On the other hand, if
the 50 shares already owned formed a part of the 7,000 shares not
controlled by the majority, then the total number of shares to be
voted would be 3,050. By using 3,050 shares as a basis of compu-
tation, the chart, or formula (1) or (3) would reveal that 382 shares
would- be needed. The 50 shares should be subtracted from 382,
leaving only 332 shares to be purchased, but all of these 332 shares
would have to be purchased from among the 3,000 majority shares
and all of the 382 shares thus amassed would have to be pitted against
the remaining 2,668 majority shares. Finally, in certain situations
two possible methods of computation are left open to the would-be
voter. For example, if one did not own any shares at all, and a ma-
jority faction owned 3,000 shares which would be voted in an ap-
proaching election, leaving 7,000 inactive shares outstanding, formu-
lae (1-5), or the chart, could be used, provided the needed number
of shares are purchased from among the 3,000 majority shares; but
formulae (6-10) could also be used and the needed number of shares
purchased from among the 7,000 inactive shares. Though the needed
number of shares indicated by each of the above processes would be
different, yet the same purpose would be accomplished if they were
purchased from their respective sources. For instance, if one de-
sired to elect two out of seven directors, the use of formula (1), or
the chart, would indicate that 751 shares would be needed. But the
use of formula (6) would indicate that 1,001 shares would be needed.
By purchasing 751 of the 3,000 majority shares, one would then have
751 X 7, or 5,257 votes, 2,629 of which votes could be cast for one
candidate, and 2,628 for the other. The majority, with 3,000- 751,
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or 2,249 shares, would have 2,249 X 7, or 15,743 votes, 2,623 of
which it could give to one candidate, and 2,624 to each of the other
five. Therefore, this first method of computation would assure the
election of two directors out of seven. On the other hand, if one
purchased 1,001 shares, pursuant to the result reached by the use of
formula (6), from among the 7,000 inactive shares, he would have
'1,001 X 7, or 7,007 votes, 3,504 of which could be cast for one can-
didate, and 3,503 for the other. The majority, with 3,000 shares,
would have 3,000 X 7, or 21,000 votes, only 3,500 of which it could
cast for each of six candidates. Hence, this second method of com-
putation would also produce the desired result. Obviously, the use
of formula (1), or the chart, would, in the above example, be pre-
ferable where all of the 751 needed shares could be purchased from
among the 3,000 majority shares. But suppose that only 250 of these
751 shares could be purchased from the majority? Such purchase
would leave the majority with only 2,750 shares, which number
should be substituted for the symbol r in formula (6), and the answer
would be 918. One could then purchase 918- 250, or 668 of the
7,000 inactive shares, which would be a saving of 1,001 -918, or
83 shares. But if there were no majority shares available, then it goes
without saying that neither the chart nor formulae (1-5) could be
used, but formulae (6-10), or in rare instances, formulae (11-12),
would have to be used instead.
A final word of caution may be voiced concerning the chart and
all of the formulae used in this article. It has already been shown
that all of these formulae are designed to ascertain the absolute mini-
mum number of shares needed in order to accomplish a desired end.
The same is true of the chart. Consequently, all of such shares must
be concentrated on the specific number of candidates indicated by the
symbol c in all formulae in which such symbol is used, or by the
applicable digits in the vertical row at the left of the chart; and each
of such candidates must receive as many of the votes produced by
these shares as does any other candidate, or as nearly an equal por-
tion as the division of these votes allows.
Though a percentage chart which may be used alternatively with
formula (6) has been devised, yet its use would require such mental
gymnastics on the part of the reader as to render its publication un-
profitable.
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